How to Verify a Trading Partner's Bank Account Before You Pay

How to check a supplier's or buyer's bank details before you pay: payee name checks, callbacks, change requests and controls that stop payment fraud.

· 12 min read · TradeRepute team

You can check a supplier's registration, screen its owners and read its trade references, and still lose the money at the last step. The payment goes to an account the supplier never opened. The goods were real, the company was real, and the invoice was real. Only the bank details were fake.

This guide covers that last step. It explains what a bank account check can and cannot prove, which name checks banks now run in the UK, the EU, Australia and other markets, and how to build a simple routine for first payments and change requests. It is written for importers, exporters and finance teams that pay or collect across borders.

It does not repeat our guides on verifying an overseas supplier before a deposit or the KYB checklist for trade counterparties. Those posts confirm who the company is. This one confirms that the money reaches it.

Why bank details are the weak point

Most payment fraud in trade does not need a fake company. It needs one convincing email. A criminal gets into a real email thread, or copies it closely, and sends "updated" bank details just before a payment is due. The buyer pays a genuine invoice into the wrong account.

The FBI's 2025 Internet Crime Report recorded 24,768 business email compromise complaints in 2025, with reported losses of $3,046,598,558. The same report shows $2,770,151,146 for 2024. These are only the cases reported to the FBI, so the real figure is higher.

The same report adds that criminals now use AI chat tools to write official-sounding emails. That makes the old advice to "look for bad grammar" much weaker. A clean, well-written email that asks you to change bank details proves nothing.

What a bank account check can and cannot prove

Be clear about what you are testing before you start.

A good check can show:

  • The account exists and can receive the currency you plan to send
  • The name on the account matches, or does not match, the name you entered
  • The account belongs to a business, not a person, in markets where the check returns that
  • The person who sent the details really works for the counterparty, if you confirm through a channel you already trust

A check cannot show:

  • That the company is solvent or will ship
  • That the people who own the company are clean on sanctions lists
  • That a "match" result came from the right company, if a fraudster opened an account in a near-identical name

That last point matters. Name checks compare the name you type against the name the receiving bank holds. If a fraudster registers a company called "Shenzhen Brightway Trading" to impersonate "Shenzhen Brightway Industrial", a check on the fake name can still come back as a match. The bank check is one layer. The legal entity checks in our counterparty due diligence checklist are another.

Payee name checks by market

Several payment systems now check the payee's name against the account before money leaves. Coverage is uneven, and cross-border payments are where gaps remain.

  • United Kingdom. Service: Confirmation of Payee. What it checks: Account name and account type for UK sterling payments. Key dates and limits: Returns match, close match, no match or unavailable. You decide whether to pay.
  • Euro area. Service: Verification of Payee under the Instant Payments Regulation. What it checks: Payee name against IBAN for standard and instant euro credit transfers. Key dates and limits: Free to the payer. Live in euro area countries from 9 October 2025; non-euro EU countries by 9 July 2027.
  • Australia. Service: Confirmation of Payee. What it checks: Name against BSB and account number on new or edited payees. Key dates and limits: Match, close match or no match, shown before payment at participating banks.
  • United States (ACH). Service: Nacha fraud monitoring rules. What it checks: Banks and business senders must monitor for payments sent under false pretenses. Key dates and limits: Not a name check you see before paying. Phase 1 from 20 March 2026, with remaining senders in phase 2.
  • Cross-border (bank to bank). Service: Swift Payment Pre-validation. What it checks: Beneficiary account and name checks between banks before a cross-border payment. Key dates and limits: Your bank must use the service. No public interface for businesses.

Three practical points follow from this table.

First, a domestic check usually does not cover the payment you care about most. If you are a German buyer paying a supplier in Vietnam in US dollars, Verification of Payee does not apply. You need to ask your bank which checks, if any, it runs on that route.

Second, every system above leaves the final choice to you. NatWest's own page states that Confirmation of Payee cannot stop a payment, and that if you proceed after a close match or no match without checking, the bank may not be able to recover the money.

Third, the US has no national payee name check you see before you pay. Nacha's rules define "False Pretenses" to include misrepresenting the ownership of the account to be credited, which covers vendor impersonation. That pushes banks and business senders to monitor for fraud, but you should still run your own checks.

Step 1: Tie the account to the legal entity

Start with the company you verified, not the bank details you were sent.

Write down the counterparty's full legal name, registration number and country, from an official register. Then compare the bank details against that record:

  • Does the account name exactly match the legal name? Small differences, like "Ltd" versus "Limited", are normal. A different word in the name is not.
  • Is the bank in the same country as the company? A Turkish supplier with an account in Turkey is expected. The same supplier asking you to pay an account in another country needs a reason you can check.
  • Is the account in a company's name, not a person's?
  • Does the bank name and address match the bank's identifier (the SWIFT/BIC code or IBAN)? You can confirm that an IBAN is correctly built and which bank it belongs to through your bank or a reputable IBAN checker. A valid format does not prove who owns the account.

If anything does not fit, stop. Ask for an explanation in writing, then check it through Step 3.

Some third-party accounts are legitimate. Large groups may collect through a central treasury company. A supplier that sells its invoices to a factoring company will ask you to pay the factor. In those cases you should get a formal notice from the new payee or a letter on the supplier's letterhead naming the new account, and you should confirm it by phone with someone you already know at the supplier. "Please pay our agent" in an email is not enough.

Step 2: Run your bank's name check and read the result

Where your bank offers a payee name check, use it on every new payee, even when you are in a hurry.

Read the result carefully:

  • Match. The name you entered matches the receiving bank's records. Go ahead with your normal approval, but remember the near-identical name problem above.
  • Close match. The bank usually shows you the actual account name. Compare it against the legal name on the register, not against the email. A close match that is a known trading name may be fine. A close match that is a different company is a stop.
  • No match. Do not pay. Contact the counterparty through a trusted channel, as in Step 3.
  • Unavailable. The receiving bank does not take part or the service is down. Treat this as "not checked", not as "passed".

Save a screenshot or export of the result in the supplier's file, with the date. If something goes wrong later, it shows what you checked.

Step 3: Confirm by callback through a channel you already trust

This is the most important control in this guide, and the cheapest.

Call the counterparty on a phone number you found yourself. Good sources are the company's official website (typed in, not clicked from the email), the number on an earlier contract, a contact you have spoken to before, or a trade body directory. Never use a phone number from the email or invoice that carried the new bank details. NatWest's business guidance gives the same advice: do not rely on phone numbers quoted in the email itself.

On the call:

  • Ask for the person you normally deal with, or for their finance team
  • Read the account details back to them, digit by digit, rather than asking them to read the details to you
  • Ask when and why the details were issued or changed
  • Write down the name of the person, the time and what they confirmed

If they cannot confirm, or seem surprised, assume the email account is compromised. Tell them by phone, and do not reply to the email thread.

Step 4: Test cross-border accounts differently

Cross-border payments are slower to recall and harder to trace, so add one more layer.

  • Ask your bank what it checks. Some banks run beneficiary checks between banks on cross-border routes through services such as Swift's pre-validation. Ask whether your route is covered and what result you would see.
  • Send a small test payment for large first payments. Send a small amount, then ask the counterparty, by phone, to confirm the exact amount received. This proves the account works and that the person you spoke to can see it. It does not prove the account belongs to the company, so do it alongside Steps 1 to 3, not instead of them.
  • Use payment terms that reduce exposure. For a new supplier, a smaller first deposit, payment against shipping documents or a letter of credit means less money at risk if the account is wrong. Our guide on underwriting an overseas buyer covers payment terms from the seller's side.

Also check the account owner and bank against sanctions lists. A legitimate supplier can still bank somewhere you cannot pay. Our guide to screening a supplier against sanctions lists covers the free tools.

Step 5: Treat every change request as a new account

A request to change bank details is the single most common sign of payment fraud. Handle it as if the supplier were brand new.

Set one written rule for your team: no bank detail change is entered into the payment system until it passes Steps 1 to 3. No exceptions for urgency, seniority or a long relationship.

Common lines in fraudulent change requests include:

  • "Our account is under audit, please use our other account this month."
  • "We have changed banks for tax reasons."
  • "Please keep this confidential, our usual contact is away."
  • "Payment is overdue, we need it today or the shipment will be held."

None of these is impossible for a real supplier. All of them deserve a callback. Real suppliers understand the check, and many will thank you for it.

Watch the timing, too. A change request that arrives just before a large payment, or just after a shipment leaves port, is a classic pattern.

Step 6: Build controls inside your own team

Fraud often succeeds because one person can change and pay in the same afternoon. A few internal controls close that gap:

  • Split duties. The person who changes supplier bank details should not be the person who approves the payment.
  • Lock the supplier master file. Only a small number of staff should be able to edit bank details, and every edit should be logged.
  • Second approval for first payments and changes. A second person checks the callback note before the first payment to any new or changed account.
  • Alert on changes. Many accounting and banking systems can flag a payment to an account that was changed recently. Turn that on.
  • Train the people who pay. A ten-minute briefing on change requests and callbacks is worth more than any tool.

Keep it simple enough that people follow it on a busy Friday.

A worked example

This example is made up to show the process.

A UK homewares importer has bought from a ceramics supplier in Portugal for two years, paying a euro account in Portugal. In March, the importer's accounts team gets an email that looks like it is from the supplier's sales manager. It attaches an invoice for €48,000 and says the company has moved to a new bank in another EU country "for better FX rates". The email address is one letter different from the usual one.

The team follows its rule. They do not reply. They call the supplier's switchboard on the number from the signed supply contract. The sales manager says the company has not changed banks and has sent no email. The importer pays the usual account, warns the supplier and reports the attempt to its bank.

Had the email been genuine, the process would have looked the same: a callback, a written letter on the supplier's letterhead naming the new account, a name check where available, and a second approver before the first payment. The only cost would have been a short phone call.

Red flags in bank details

  • The account name differs from the legal name on the register
  • The account is in a person's name for a company payment
  • The bank is in a different country from the company, with no clear reason
  • Bank details arrive or change by email, especially close to a payment date
  • The email address or domain is slightly different from the usual one
  • Pressure to pay today, or to keep the change secret from your usual contact
  • The name check returns no match or close match to a different company
  • The counterparty will not confirm by phone or offers only a number from the same email

If you think you paid the wrong account

Speed matters more than anything else.

  • Call your bank at once and ask it to recall the payment and contact the receiving bank. Use the bank's fraud line, not a general enquiry number.
  • Report it to the police or fraud authority in your country. In the US, that includes the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center. The 2025 IC3 report says its Recovery Asset Team worked on 3,900 incidents in 2025 involving $1,163,919,846 of attempted theft and helped freeze $679,013,183. Fast reporting gives that kind of process the best chance.
  • Secure your email. Change passwords, turn on multi-factor sign-in and check for forwarding rules a criminal may have set.
  • Tell the supplier by phone, so they can secure their own systems and warn other customers.
  • Keep records of the emails, the payment and every call. Your bank, insurer and lawyer will need them.

Recovery is never guaranteed, especially across borders. Prevention is far cheaper than recovery.

Bank account checklist you can reuse

  • Legal name, registration number and country confirmed from an official register
  • Account name matches legal name; bank country fits the company
  • Any third-party account explained in a formal letter and confirmed by phone
  • Payee name check run where available; result saved with date
  • Callback made on a number you sourced yourself; name, time and details recorded
  • Test payment for large first cross-border payments, confirmed by phone
  • Account owner and bank screened against sanctions lists
  • Second approver signed off first payment or change
  • Supplier master file change logged

How TradeRepute fits

Bank checks confirm where money goes. They do not tell you how a company behaves as a trading partner. TradeRepute collects trade references from businesses that have traded with a company, backed by documents such as invoices, bills of lading or contracts. You can read how verification works and the review standards. References can show how other businesses found a company to deal with, including whether it delivered or paid as agreed. Read them alongside your own checks on the company's trade history, the supplier vetting steps and how to verify a foreign buyer. A reference is one business's experience, not a guarantee.

Disclaimer

Business-to-business trade references for due-diligence purposes only. Not a credit report, credit rating or legal, financial or investment advice. References are the opinions of verified reviewers. Reviewers are anonymous to the public and the reviewed company. Evidence is reviewed but accuracy is not guaranteed; companies may dispute a reference privately.

  • Payment fraud
  • Counterparty verification
  • Due diligence
  • Cross-border payments
  • Supplier verification